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Recent Developments

Bush v. Vera

I

n the plurality decision of
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct.
1941 (1996), the Supreme Court of
the United States held that three
Texas congressional districts violated the Fourteenth Amendment
due to racial gerrymandering. In
applying the precedent of Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995),
the Court found the use of highly
detailed racial data and abandonment of traditional redistricting
principles, coupled with a commitment to create majority-minority
districts, required the application
of strict scrutiny. Further, the
Court found that the bizarre district
boundaries were the result of racial
and not political manipulation, and
thus were unconstitutional.
The 1990 national census revealed that an urban population
increase entitled Texas to an additional three seats in the House of
Representatives. In attempting to
comply with the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.,
the Texas Legislature created two
new districts and reconfigured
another district. District TwentyNine became a majority Hispanic
district and Districts Eighteen and
Thirty were drawn to be majority
African-American districts. The
United States Department of Justice approved the plan and Texas
employed it in the 1992 congressional elections.
The respondents, six Texas
citizens residing in the reconfigured districts, filed suit, claiming
that twenty-four of the thirty Texas

Subordination Of
Traditional
Districting Principles
To Achieve Minority
Representation Is
Violative Of The
Fourteenth
Amendment
By Paul 1. Wilson
congressional districts were racially gerrymandered in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
held that Districts Eighteen,
Twenty-Nine, and Thirty were
unconstitutional. The district court
found the Texas Legislature at the
outset strove to create majorityminority districts. In addition, the
district court found that the use of
sophisticated redistricting software
to refine political boundaries using
racial demographics resulted in a
violation of equal protectiqn. The
Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari to determine whether the racial classifications embodied in the challenged
districts were narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.
In beginning its analysis, the
Court determined whether the respondents had been subjected to
any racial classification and therefore had standing to seek relief.
Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951 (citing
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct.

2431, 2436 (1995)(plaintiff residing in racially gerrymandered district was denied equal protection
by state legislature)). Applying
the Hays rationale, the Court found
that the Respondents had standing
to challenge Districts Eighteen,
Twenty-Nine, and Thirty. ld.
Next, the Court examined its
criteria for establishing whether an
election district is subject to strict
scrutiny. The Court noted that
strict scrutiny applies to redistricting legislation that is so irregular
that segregation of the races for
voting purposes is the only rational
conclusion. !d. at 1951 (citing
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,642
(1995)). The Court also recognized that strict scrutiny applies
when race '''was the legislature's
dominant and controlling rationale
in drawing its district lines. '" ld.
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995)). Finally,
the Court acknowledged that strict
scrutiny does not automatically
apply to intentionally created
majority-minority districts. ld.
(citing DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.
Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), summarily aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2637
(1995)).
The Governor of Texas, the
United States, and private intervenors, as petitioners, argued that the
Texas Legislature's goals included
incumbency protection, in addition
to creating majority-minority districts. !d. The Court, however,
upheld the district court's finding
that the "districts at issue 'have no
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integrity in terms of traditional,
neutral redistricting criteria. '" Id.
(quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F.
Supp. 1304, 1339 (S.D. Tx.
1994)). The Court also agreed
with the district court that direct
evidence of intent to create
majority-minority districts and the
use of a computer mapping program to create block-by-block
districts further supported the
claim of racial gerrymandering.
Id. at 1953. The Court opined that
these findings weighed in favor of
application of strict scrutiny, and
that each of the three districts must
be scrutinized to determine if race
was the predominate factor in redistricting decisions. Id. at 195354.
In examining District Thirty,
petitioners claimed that the boundaries had been drawn to "unite
communities of interest in a single
district and ... to protect incumbents." Id. at 1955. While acknowledging that a State is free to
use certain data to effect political
gerrymandering, the Court held
that when a racial proxy is substituted for political characteristics,
the application of strict scrutiny is
required. Id. at 1956. The Court
noted that, despite the correlation
between race and political association, the district maps revealed
"that political considerations were
subordinated to racial classifications." Id. at 1957. Finding that
race had been used as a proxy to
protect incumbency and to increase minority population within
District Thirty, the Court concluded that District Thirty was
subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at
27.1 U. Balt. L.F. 26

1958.
Turning its attention to Districts Eighteen and Twenty-Nine,
the Court noted the districts were
inexplicably intertwined .. Id. In
affirming the district court's finding of "utter disregard for traditional redistricting criteria," the
Court opined that the boundaries
were based upon racial quotas. Id.
at 1959-60.
Accordingly, the
Court upheld the district court's
finding that the district boundaries
were subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
at 1960.
Next, the Court examined
whether the racial classifications
embodied in the district boundaries
were narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. Id. Petitioners claimed that they were
complying with § 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act, which states that a
violation exists if the political processes for nomination and election
are not equally open to minority
participation. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(b)). In refuting this claim,
the Court held that a State may not
"subordinate traditional districting
principles to race" to escape § 2(a)
liability. Id. at 1961. In addition,
the Court held that because the
district's bizarre shapes were dictated by racial and not political
considerations, any claim that they
were narrowly tailored to avoid §
2(a) liability must be precluded.
!d. at 1962.
Petitioners next argued that
Texas had a compelling interest in
remedying past and present racial
discrimination. ld. The Court
noted that two conditions must be
satisfied for Texas' interest in rem-

edying discrimination to be compelling: (1) the discrimination
must be identifiable, and (2) the
State must have a strong evidentiary reason to conclude that remedial action is necessary. Id. at
1962-63. While acknowledging
that petitioners were attempting to
remedy the problem of vote dilution, the Court held that this situation did "not justify race-based
districting unless 'the State emsound
districting
ploy[ s]
principles. '" Id. at 1963 (quoting
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657).
The petitioners finally argued
that the State had a compelling
interest in complying with § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. Id. The
Court discounted this argument,
stating that the aim of § 5 is to
prohibit the retrogression of minorities in exercising their voting
franchise. Id. The Court held that
retrogression avoidance does not
grant a State freedom to act in any
manner necessary to continue minority electoral success. Id. Thus,
the Court found that District Eighteen "is not narrowly tailored to the
avoidance of § 5 liability." Id.
In a dissent joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice
Stevens argued that the majority
had incorrectly implemented its
own racial gerrymandering tests.
Id. at 1974. Justice Stevens believed that because the districts
were the result of Texas' attempt
to comply with the Voting Rights
Act, the redistricting plan satisfied
strict scrutiny. Id. at 1975. Justice
Stevens noted that a proper reading
of the record would result in the
conclusion that the intentional
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race-conscious design, protection
of incumbency, and communities
of interest considerations would
override any suggestion that race
dominated the redistricting. Id. at
1980.
In a separate dissent joined by
Justices Ginsberg and Breyer,
Justice Souter stated that the Court
should outline the specific elements necessary to identify an
injury distinguishable from proper
Id. at
constitutional conduct.
1997. In addition, Justice Souter
argued that the Court's failure to
fashion districting criteria inclusive of racial considerations would
result in the Court having oversight of all redistricting efforts. Id.

at 1998.
The ramifications to Maryland
congressional districts if challenged on the basis of Bush v. Vera
would be felt throughout the
Baltimore-Washington metropolitan region. As a result of redistricting in 1991, minority population in Maryland's Second, Third
and Fifth Districts diminished,
while it greatly increased in the
Seventh District and the newlycreated Fourth District. Barry
Rascovar, Racial Redistricting Is A
Goner. Good Riddance!, BaIt. Sun,
June 30, 1996, at E3. While
Maryland's districts are not the
result of bizarre boundary aberra-

,
Guuo:U

.

.: ,,:,."',T.. "

/

,I

{

6

Editor's Note: Prior to Bush v.
Vera, the Representatives for
Texas Congressional Districts
Eighteen, Twenty-Nine, and Thirty
were Sheila Jackson Lee, Gene
Green, and Eddie Bernice Johnson.
Subsequent to redistricting that
resulted from Bush, Representatives Lee and Johnson won
reelection in their redrawn districts
10
the 1996 Congressional
elections.
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tions similar to the Texas districts,
they do display the racial gerrymandering characteristics at issue
in Bush. A new challenge under
Bush could possibly succeed.
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